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Post-War Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina 




The levels and intensity of violence in Bosnia 
following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 
December 1995 present an encouraging exception to the 
patterns of violence observed in many of the other post-
conflict settings examined in this volume.1 The suggestion 
here is emphatically not that post-war Bosnia has been 
spared ‘post-conflict’ violence. Indeed, violence was very 
much part of the early post-war landscape, especially so in 
the period between late 1995 and 1998. The overall picture 
nonetheless compares favourably to other cases of war-to-
peace transitions where civil wars were also brought to a 
formal end through a negotiated settlement.  
 This requires explanation. After all, from the vantage 
point of late 1995 there were good grounds for expecting a 
‘violent peace’ in Bosnia, the most diverse and delicately 
balanced of the former Yugoslav republics in terms of 
ethnicity. And there were certainly warnings to that effect 
from thoughtful and perceptive observers. Writing in May 
1996 Susan Woodward concluded:  
 
The anarchy, chaos, and marauding by ex-soldiers and 
police that accompanied the transfer of Serb areas of 
Sarajevo [February-March 1996] will not be an isolated 
case. The conditions for a general breakdown in order 
as soldiers are sent home without jobs, politicians  
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are preoccupied with elections, the trauma of war 
begins to be felt, and the resources for economic 
reconstruction are slow in coming will surely increase 
(Woodward 1996: 89).  
 
In the context of its time, such predictions were 
anything but far-fetched. The Dayton Peace Accord followed 
more than three years of brutal civil war among the 
country’s Serb, Croat and Bosniak communities.2 The war saw 
widespread physical destruction and the death of nearly 
100,000 people. An estimated 40 per cent of those killed 
were civilians.3 It was also a war that witnessed grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, large-scale atrocities 
and countless crimes against humanity. Of special relevance 
to the prospect of post-settlement violence, it was an 
identity-driven conflict defined and fought in the name of 
ethnicity and religion. As ascriptive categories, these 
were far more malleable than nationalist politicians, 
determined to incite ethnic tensions and foment violence, 
made out. As in all civil wars, however, the experience of 
war itself, including in this case the heinous practice of 
‘ethnic cleansing’, served to crystallise communal 
allegiances and radicalise identities. This development was 
bound to raise the spectre of continued ethnic violence, 
score-settling and revenge killings after the formal end of 
hostilities.  
 There was yet another feature of the Bosnian war whose 
legacy it was thought, not unreasonably, would also be to 
stoke post-war violence. This was the large number of 
irregular and paramilitary formations involved in military 
operations during the war. Many of these had developed 
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close ties to – and indeed were often indistinguishable 
from – organized criminal groups turned warlords. In the 
course of the war these had engaged in a range of illicit 
activities, from looting, theft and ransom to trafficking 
in contraband. Many of them were also deeply implicated in 
war crimes. The wartime alliances forged between criminal 
and political elites frequently survived into the post-war 
phase, contributing to the growth of organized crime in the 
country and the wider region (UNODC 2008; Andreas 2004). 
However, while organised crime remains an important 
challenge, the levels of overt violence associated with it 
have been low.  
 How, then, given these legacies of war should one 
account for the post-war level of violence in Bosnia?  
 
Central Argument  
 
There are two basic reasons why post-war violence, 
using for now Charles Tilly’s (2003) more restrictive focus 
on physical violence, has remained comparatively low. These 
are closely connected. 
 First, the early post-war years in Bosnia saw no 
sustained effort to reverse the facts created by war, that 
is, to undo the ethnic, territorial and political partition 
of the country. The official line at Dayton, it is true, 
called for post-war ethnic reintegration and gave refugees 
and displaced persons an unqualified right to return to 
their pre-war homes. In reality, as Marcus Cox has 
observed, the actual ‘strategy implicit in the Dayton 
Accord was to allow the ethnically defined, wartime regimes 
to consolidate their separate spheres of influence’ (Cox 
2008: 250-1). That strategy involved the creation of a very 
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weak federal structure and saw no attempt to redraw de 
facto front lines at the end of hostilities. It also left 
the three wartime armies intact, even though it nominally 
merged the Bosnian-Croat Army (HVO) and Bosniak Army 
(ARBiH). The result was to ensure that levels of ‘minority’ 
return remained low and thus, in effect, to remove or at 
least curtail an important source of violence in the early 
post-Dayton years. Since 2000, some localities, including 
areas that saw heavy fighting during the war, have 
experienced notable progress in minority returns and 
reintegration. Even so, wartime divisions still run deep 
and, as will be argued, official data (from both government 
sources and international agencies such as the UNHCR) tend 
to understate the country’s persistent cleavages.  
 And yet, continued de facto ethnic segregation alone 
cannot explain the levels and patterns of post-war violence 
in Bosnia (Stroschein 2005). This brings us to the second 
reason why levels of violence have remained comparatively 
low: the violence-mitigating effect of the international 
military and civilian presence deployed to the country 
following the end of hostilities in 1995. The scale and the 
resources devoted by the international community to the 
stabilisation of post-war Bosnia dwarf that of all other 
comparable cases. This extended international presence – 
60,000 NATO troops and some 2,000 UN police following the 
peace agreement4 - has generated its own problems, 
including a dependency relationship with the international 
community, which, some argue, has acted as a structural 
disincentive to meet post-conflict challenges, especially 
in the economic and political spheres. The quality of 
outside involvement and the strategic decisions taken on 
issues ranging from the organisation of elections to the 
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reform of the country’s security sector have also been the 
subject of much debate and criticism. Even so, the sheer 
scale of the outside presence, along with the commitment to 
remain engaged for the ‘long haul’, has clearly had the 
effect of limiting levels of overt violence. Importantly, 
however, this effect was neither automatic nor immediate. 
It required - as will be argued more fully - an early 
readjustment of the force posture, some innovative action 
and the adoption of a less restrictive definition of the 
mandate on the part of the external actors – military and 
civilian – sent to implement the Dayton Agreement.  
 These considerations do raise a further question, one 
that goes beyond Tilly’s (2003) definition but which the 
Bosnian case nonetheless prompts: has the unprecedented 
level of international involvement in post-war Bosnia 
adequately addressed the structural bases for renewed 
violence? Many feel that it has not. A detailed exploration 
of the structural bases of violence in Bosnia would require 
a more comprehensive analysis of the ‘ethnification’ of key 
institutions, which has done much to keep alive and harden 
ethnic positions in the media, education and within 
political parties. Such an analysis is outside the scope of 
the chapter, though we return briefly, towards the end, to 
the dilemma of how to balance short-term concerns about 
reducing violence with the long-term aims of stability and 
peacebuilding. 
 The chapter is divided into two necessarily 
overlapping parts. The first surveys the extent and forms 
of post-conflict violence in Bosnia. It also draws 
attention to some of the difficulties – practical and 
political - of categorising violence, of arriving at 
reliable figures, and of establishing clear-cut trends, 
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including of nominal as opposed to ‘true’ refugee return. 
Even in the face of these difficulties, the data suggest 
that the wartime legacy of displacement and separation 
among communities has endured and shaped post-war patterns 
of violence.  
 The second part focuses on the ‘nature of the post-war 
peace’ and on the implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accord. Specifically, this involves a closer look at the 
role played by the international presence in the mitigation 
and control of post-war violence.  
 
 
POST-CONFLICT VIOLENCE IN BOSNIA: CATEGORIES, TRENDS, 
EXPLANATIONS 
 
Presenting a picture of the extent and the types of post-
war violence in Bosnia requires an initial and cautionary 
note about the problem of sources and data. Given the 
central role that control of populations played during the 
war, any discussion of numbers - be that of casualties or 
returned refugees – was bound to become, and has remained 
to this day, politically fraught and emotionally charged. 
The point is well illustrated by the long-running debate 
about, and the difficulties of organising, a new population 
census. The last such census was held in 1991, that is, on 
the eve of the war. Although the need for a new census is 
therefore widely accepted in principle, the subject has 
proved too delicate for agreement to be reached (ICG 2009: 
5; Balkan Insight 2010). The same holds true for discussion 
about the number of war deaths. Until 2007, when a newly 
created and independent research institute published its 
findings, the most widely cited casualty figures ranged 
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from 250,000 to 300,000.5 In contrast, the Research and 
Documentation Centre (RDC) in Sarajevo found that a total 
of 97,207 people were killed in the conflict, including 
57,523 soldiers and 39,684 civilians. Of the soldiers 
killed or missing in action, the RDC concluded that 53.8 
per cent were Bosniaks, 36.2 per cent Serbs and 9.8 per 
cent Croats. As for civilians, 83.3 per cent were said to 
be Bosniaks, 10.3 per cent Serbs and 5.4 per cent Croats.6 
While this research has generated much debate in Bosnia, 
the figures arrived at are now considered the most detailed 
and reliable to date. Indeed, the Demography Unit of the 
ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor supports the RDC numbers, 
based on the results of their final estimate of death 
tolls.7 Even so, the continuing debate on the subject and 
the passion it has generated within Bosnia shows just how 
deeply political the subject of population figures remains. 
 The fact is that political actors on all sides have 
manipulated figures, exploited the lack of reliable 
statistical information and made the most of anecdotal 
evidence to stoke ethnic tensions and promote partisan 
agendas. Most fundamentally, the absence of agreed-upon 
statistical data has complicated the task of establishing 
an accurate picture of refugee return (specifically 
‘minority’ return), a critical shortcoming given that so 
much of the post-conflict violence in the country has been 
directly linked to this issue.  
The politicisation of data on violence is also evident 
in various attempts by political actors to stir up 
nationalistic sentiment by deliberately mischaracterising 
petty crime and ‘conventional’ criminal behaviour as 
ethnically motivated. Two incidents that shocked the 
citizens of Sarajevo in early 2008 are illustrative of this 
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trend. In February 2008 a high school boy was stabbed to 
death by three juvenile delinquents. The subsequent 
investigation established that the assailants neither knew 
the victim, nor were they provoked by him into committing 
the crime. Yet, the fact that the boy was a Croat and the 
assailants Bosniak led sections of the Croatian media to 
portray Sarajevo as a ‘dangerous city for Croats’ (Nova TV 
2008). In a second incident an elderly lady in a Sarajevan 
neighbourhood was brutally murdered. The victim was in this 
instance Serb and the assailants Roma juveniles, which 
prompted media in Republika Srpska (RS) to describe 
Sarajevo as a ‘dangerous city for Serbs’ (Vecernje Novosti 
Daily 2008), even though, again, the police had determined 
that the attack was not ethnically motivated.  
 These are but two illustrations of a broader trend. 
They also point to yet another deficiency in the source 
material: the paucity of micro-level studies of violence, 
that is, analysis of the role of ‘local - village, town, 
community - and personal dynamics’ in the generation and 
perpetuation of violence (Woodward 2007: 156). As Stathis 
Kalyvas’s work on civil war violence makes clear, this 
problem is not unique to Bosnia and suggests, at the very 
least, that one should be cautious about ‘meta’ 
explanations for patterns of violence (Kalyvas & Sambanis 
2005: 214-16). 
Mindful of these caveats, it is nonetheless possible 
to construct an overall picture of post-conflict violence 
by drawing both on local sources (interviews and local 
media, down to the municipality level) and data collected 
by outside agencies and observers.  
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Ethnically Motivated Violence: a Brief Descriptive Overview  
 
Every year between 1995 and 2001 saw sporadic attacks on 
returnees, ethnically based violence and intimidation of 
journalists and international representatives. Following a 
period of escalated violence in the immediate post-war 
period, the scale and intensity of attacks has gradually 
declined, especially since 2001, though they have not 
ceased altogether. Attacks have ranged in gravity from 
murder and arson to the destruction (bombing or mining) of 
property, including mosques, churches, cemeteries and other 
sites of cultural significance. In general terms, it is 
possible to group the violence into three broad categories, 
which helps convey the evolution and pattern of attacks 
over time: unfinished ethnic cleansing; violence targeting 
refugee return; and intimidation and discrimination.  
 
Unfinished ethnic cleansing 
 
The first post-Dayton year, 1996, was also by far the most 
violent in Bosnia’s post-war history, with tensions and 
violent incidents involving all three of Bosnia’s main 
ethnic groups. Along with extensive human rights abuses, 
ethnically motivated killings and return prevention, 
violence also took the form of large-scale forced civilian 
displacement. The single largest case of such displacement 
was the exodus of approximately 60-70,000 Serb civilians in 
February and March 1996 from the Grbavica neighbourhood and 
the suburbs of Vogosca, Ilijas, Hadzici and Ilidza, areas 
of Sarajevo held by the Serbs during the war but which 
under the Dayton Peace Accord were to be transferred to 
Federation control.  
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 Many of these Serbs were resettled in areas formerly 
inhabited mainly by Bosniaks. The goal was to prevent 
Bosniaks from returning and in doing so, consolidate 
Bosnian Serb control over those areas acquired during the 
war. The Bosniak authorities adopted a similar strategy, 
moving Bosniak refugees from other parts of the country 
into newly acquired suburbs. All in all, an estimated 
200,000 people were moved in this one single episode (Sell 
2000: 180; Human Rights Watch 1997).  
 Although Bosniak leaders did much to stoke the fears 
of local Serbs in the days before the transfer, the exodus 
from Sarajevo was initiated and encouraged by the Serb 
leadership in Republika Srpska, who wanted the remaining 
Serbs to leave the city now that it was almost entirely in 
the hands of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many 
were forced to leave under threat of death and some were 
killed for disobeying the orders (Sell 2000: 183, 193-7; 
Kinzer 1996). 
 This exodus, and the accompanying violence, is to date 
Bosnia’s most concentrated burst of post-conflict violence. 
That this episode of widespread violence marked the first 
year of peace was, at one level, unsurprising, given the 
rawness of recent memories of war and its many horrors. But 
there is another, albeit related, reason for the scale of 
violence in early 1996. The immediate post-Dayton period 
saw the logic of wartime ‘ethnic cleansing’ play itself out 
in those few areas where it had yet to do so following the 
1995 ceasefire, most notably in the Serb-controlled suburbs 
of Sarajevo. As Louis Sell put it (2000: 179-80), ‘the 
emptying of the Serb-held suburbs locked into place the 
last piece of a jigsaw puzzle that completed the ethnic map 
of Bosnia’. A similar pattern of post-war cleansing also 
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played itself out in Croat-dominated parts of Bosnia in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. Throughout 1995-1996, in 
the words of Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2004), ‘the 
mainstream strategy was to continue low-intensity ethnic 
cleansing by specifically forcing elderly residents out of 
their homes and later by attacking refugees returning to 
Croat dominated areas’. The international force deployed to 
implement Dayton was not prepared to prevent that from 
happening, ensuring that, as Woodward observed at the time 
(1996: 17), ‘the outcome of the peace implementation 
process in its first three months has been further 
partition’. The fact that Bosnia’s police forces at the 
time were still organised along ethnic lines, and ‘were 
controlled by their respective political leaders’, did much 
to fuel the violence (US General Accounting Office 1997: 
40).  
 This trend continued into 1997, though at diminished 
intensity, no doubt in part because fear and intimidation 
now acted as a brake on attempts to return to pre-war 
localities. One of the year’s most serious incidents was 
the re-expulsion by Croats of 400 Bosniaks from their homes 
around Jajce; a dozen houses were set on fire and one 
Bosniak returnee was killed (Human Rights Watch 1998). 
Also, in Mostar, Bosniaks from the western, Croat-
controlled part of the city were forcibly evicted.8 
 
Violence targeting refugee return  
 
Every year between 1995 and 2001 saw both orchestrated 
and sporadic attacks on returnees, and weak responses by 
the competent police authorities in Bosnia. The violence 
was most pronounced in the immediate post-Dayton years and 
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has diminished gradually since then without ever completely 
disappearing.9  
 In 1996, the return of 800 Bosniaks and Croats to 
their homes near Serb-controlled Doboj resulted in a major 
incident involving around 1,500 Serbs (Human Rights Watch 
1997). Meanwhile, the return of displaced populations, 
particularly in Republika Srpska, prompted arson attacks 
and the destruction of property which targeted the 
returnees either directly or indirectly. Other forms of 
attack included the looting of factories and of public 
utilities (Bildt 1998: 193-8). By one estimate, over 300 
homes were destroyed in Bosnia in ‘late 1996 and early 
1997’ alone in ‘an effort to discourage cross-ethnic 
returns’ (US General Accounting Office 1997: 67). 
 The violence against returnees carried over into 1997 
and 1998. In 1997, twenty-five Serb houses in Croat-
controlled Drvar were burned down as their pre-war 
occupiers attempted to return. In Bosniak-controlled 
Bugojno, Croats and their homes suffered a similar fate and 
in September two Croats were murdered in Travnik (Human 
Rights Watch 1998). The following year witnessed further 
violent incidents, from arson to assault and murder, 
targeting Serb returnees in the area of Drvar, Croat 
returnees in Travnik, and Bosniak returnees in the Capljina 
and Stolac areas (Human Rights Watch 1999). Critically, 
local authorities rarely investigated cases of ethnic 
violence. Indeed, the local police, prosecutors and courts 
were often complicit in human rights abuses. This was 
especially the case in the eastern parts of the country, 
which were now part of Republika Srpska but had prior to 
the war included municipalities with majority Bosniak 
populations (ICG 2002b: 18-19). 
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 The year 2000 was presented as a ‘breakthrough’ for 
the return of refugees and displaced persons, this in spite 
of a major incident in Bratunac, in which Serbs attacked 
four buses carrying Bosniak returnees, and a number of 
similar assaults in Janja. The increase in returns 
witnessed during the year resulted from a combination of 
domestic and regional developments, including political 
changes in Croatia; advances in the property return process 
(for returnees); the international community’s increasing 
readiness to use Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
powers and NATO forces to ensure returnees’ freedom of 
movement and safety; and growing impatience on the part of 
refugees with the slow return process (ICG 2000: 5-6). 
Despite these factors, and a reduced rate of attacks, 
overall violence against formerly displaced populations 
continued. Such acts have occurred against a backdrop of 
more frequent, yet indirect, forms of intimidation, such as 
the disruption by a mob of the opening ceremony for the 
reconstruction of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, an 
incident in which one person was killed and eight were 
wounded (Human Rights Watch 2001, 2002).  
 
Intimidation and discrimination 
 
The deliberate targeting of returnees occurred 
alongside a more general trend of ethnically based 
harassment, often conducted by members of the security 
forces. Until early 1998, police stationed at illegal 
checkpoints would single out travellers seeking to cross 
Bosnia’s Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and subject 
individuals to beatings, threats, arrest and even charges 
of war crimes, all to dissuade select populations from 
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travelling across Entity borders. This practice was 
significantly reduced with the unification of the vehicle 
licence-plate system in Bosnia in 1998. Described by Martin 
Barber, former senior official working for the UN mission 
in Bosnia (UNMIBH), as ‘the death knell of the check point 
system’, it ensured that vehicles could no longer be 
identified by municipality of origin, which in addition to 
the ensuing increase in traffic at major crossing points, 
meant that the police found it more difficult to use 
illegal checkpoints to intimidate civilians. It is 
estimated that within the first month of the introduction 
of common licence plates there was a 50 per cent increase 
in crossing across Entities.10 It was an ingenious and 
innovative response by UN and OHR officials on the ground 
to what had become a major obstacle to freedom of movement, 
and its immediate effect was to reduce the scope for 
violence and intimidation.  
 Even so, ethnically based intimidation has continued, 
but has tended to take less direct forms. Indeed, levels of 
outright physical violence have remained low since 2006; in 
a report released in 2008, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) went so far as to suggest that Balkan countries, 
including Bosnia, were, in many respects, safer than 
Western Europe (UNODC 2008: 9). And yet, violence directed 
against symbols of specific ethnic groups – churches, 
mosques, graveyards and cultural events – has continued. 
Examples of such ethnically motivated violence since 2006 
have included the taking down of obituaries of 80 Bosniak 
war victims in Brcko before their funeral; the destruction 
of five tombstones in the graveyard of the Hadzi Omerova 
Mosque in Banja Luka; the provocation of Bosniaks in 
Trebinje at the beginning of a Ramadan prayer; the 
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destruction of several tombstones in a Catholic cemetery 
near Bugojno; the attempt to set fire to the Serb Orthodox 
Church in Potocari, near Srebrenica; and the public turmoil 
over the illegal construction of religious monuments and 
buildings in various towns (US Embassy to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2008). 
 
This all appears to confirm the finding of UNDP’s ‘ethnic 
stability index’ for 2000-2006, which concluded that ethnic 
relations did not improve over this period (UNDP 2006: 102-
3). It also provides part of the background to more recent 
warnings of a further deterioration in inter-ethnic 
relations, leading to the question whether organized 
violence, if not war, can return.11  
 
Nominal Versus True Refugee Returns: the Persistence of 
Wartime Divisions 
 
As outlined above, most of post-conflict violence in Bosnia 
has been linked to the return of refugees, specifically to 
so-called ‘minority returns’. Such violence can be seen as 
a continuation of wartime campaigns of ethnic cleansing, 
seeking both to create and to sustain ethnic demographic 
dominance in select areas as a path toward broader, ultra-
nationalistic, state-building projects (Mulaj 2008: Chapter 
3). 
 Such violence notwithstanding, the official statistics 
tend to paint a positive picture of refugee and internally 
displaced people (IDP) returns. Of the 2.2 million people 
displaced during the war, 1.2 million of whom fled the 
country, it is estimated that by June 2010 approximately 
579,600 IDP and 448,600 refugees had returned (UNHCR 
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2010).12 Most of these returns occurred within the first 
few post-war years and with the help of various action 
plans issued both by domestic institutions (specifically 
the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees BiH) and by 
international organisations (UNHCR, OHR, UNDP).  
 Still, these statistics only tell half the story. 
First, ‘minority returns’ – the return of a displaced or 
refugee person to the place of origin where s/he now 
represents a minority – accounts for approximately 468,800 
returns (or 45 per cent of the total), of whom 275,200 (58 
per cent) returned to the Federation, 171,500 (36 per cent) 
to Republika Srpska and 22,000 (5 per cent) to Brcko 
District (UNHCR 2010).13 These figures include some 
‘success stories’, such as the return process in the Doboj 
area of Republika Srpska, a centre of Serb nationalism 
during the war (ESI 2007). Nevertheless, the problem is 
that minority return figures cannot always be used as 
evidence of true and sustainable ‘integration’. 
Second, the conventional figures are largely based on 
the metric of property return or the right of would-be 
returnees to return to their pre-war flats or houses, taken 
away from them or abandoned in the flight from violence. 
Using this metric can be misleading, as ‘no international 
organisation or government agency has precise figures on 
how many Bosnians, after reclaiming their houses or flats – 
or receiving reconstruction assistance – then decide to 
sell or exchange them and relocate elsewhere’, or simply 
never occupied them (ICG 2002b: 11). In Kupres 
Municipality, for example, an estimated 90 per cent of 
properties reclaimed were subsequently sold or exchanged. 
In Sarajevo Canton, half (around 10,000) of the apartments 
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repossessed are thought to be uninhabited (ICG 2002b: 11; 
PRISM Research Agency 2006: 20).  
 This situation can at least partly be explained in 
terms of the tendency, especially in the late 1990s, for 
cash-strapped homeowners to reclaim a returned property 
only to sell it on via intermediaries (family, friends and 
real estate agencies), albeit for extremely low prices. 
This desperate practice was encouraged by nationalist 
propaganda, as it helped prevent the re-establishment of 
ethnic minorities in these areas. It also created 
opportunities for self-enrichment for those people with 
liquid assets, who could purchase property cheaply and sell 
it at highly inflated prices within a few years. These 
buyers were often warlords and war profiteers, who unlike 
the vast majority of the population had neither lost their 
savings during the war nor spent them on outrageously 
overpriced commodities, but for whom, in many cases, 
conflict had been lucrative.14 
 Specific studies of individual towns add strength to 
these findings. Take the small eastern Bosnian town of 
Rogatica. Before the war, 13,029 of the town’s citizens 
declared themselves as Muslims. Many of these Muslims were 
forced out of the town early in the war and some 
subsequently settled in and around Sarajevo. Return started 
soon after the war but in meagre numbers. As in other parts 
of the country, many returnees were elderly and had 
struggled to integrate in urban centres within or outside 
the country, or simply had no option but to return. As a 
result, it was not until 2005 that a returnee Bosniak baby 
was born in Rogatica (Boracic 2008; SIRLBIH 2008). Other 
small towns in rural BiH (of which there are many) have 
faced similar fates. 
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 Going further, the 2008 Municipal Elections provide 
tentative evidence of initial returnees leaving their homes 
again. Over recent years, the number of Bosniak municipal 
councillors has declined in several municipalities of 
Republika Srpska: in the 2004 Municipal Elections, SDA and 
SBiH (predominantly Bosniak parties) had four councillors 
in Rogatica, compared to only one in 2008; in Bratunac, the 
number went from 10 councillors in 2004 to only five in 
2008; in Srebrenica, it is 15 versus 11.15 While this 
decline may also relate to a low electoral turnout, it may 
indicate that returnees prefer to leave areas where they 
constitute a minority.  
The return rates in Bosnia must also be seen in the 
context of the country’s precarious economic situation; 
indeed, the economic sustainability of return is often 
identified as a key factor in determining rates of ‘true’ 
return - without jobs, people cannot go back. Yet in 
Bosnia, the issue of the economy, further accentuated by 
the current global financial crisis, also has an ethnic 
slant, due to the ‘ethnification’ of institutions alluded 
to above. Entity employment laws and the nationalist 
manipulation of the privatization process to benefit one 
group or another have contributed to ‘institutionalized 
discrimination’ against minority returnees seeking 
employment (ICG 2002b: 15). Returnees have also been 
subjected to discriminatory practices relating to access to 
pensions, social services, health care, education and 
public utilities (UNHCR 2001: 17-23). As summed up by one 
monitoring organisation at the end of 2007, the overall 
picture was clear:  
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The authorities have never made [a] distinction 
between returnees who only took repossession of their 
property and those who remained living in their 
property units. One of the primary goals in the 
implementation of Annex VII is the restoration of the 
socio-demographic structure of the BiH society, which 
had been impaired by the war. Nothing has been done 
to that effect. BiH is today divided into almost 
ethnically pure territories, while consequences of 
war migrations have only deepened through long 
standing obstructions and administrative barriers of 
authorities at all levels (Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2007). 
 
In short, the limited number of ‘true returns’ – and 
the concomitant persistence of ethnic divisions created by 
war and enshrined in Dayton – provide part of the 
explanation for the comparative lack of large-scale post-
conflict violence. As factors, low return rates, the fear 
of going back, and the subsequent tendency to sell former 
property rather than return to it created a situation where 
overt physical violence was only seldom needed to enforce 
and maintain the ethnic segregation vied for by some during 
the war. Even those who did return faced a tough choice: to 
live life under constant threat and usually in poverty and 
isolation or to attempt a new life elsewhere. Many opted 
for the second option. In a very powerful sense, therefore, 
the ethnic cleansing continued into the post-conflict 
environment, but by other means.  
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DAYTON, THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE AND POST-
CONFLICT VIOLENCE 
 
There is little doubt that the international security 
presence in Bosnia after 1995 played a key role in 
containing post-war violence. That role, however, has 
evolved over time. Indeed, there is a close correlation 
between the way in which the international military and 
police forces interpreted their mandate and the ambient 
levels of violence in Bosnia. This in turn suggests that 
the deployment of external military and police forces, even 
on the scale seen in Bosnia, is no guarantee per se of 
post-war stability; much depends on the intervening 
variables of mandate, mandate interpretation and of 
capabilities.   
 The Dayton Accords provided ‘the first post-war set of 
benchmarks by which Bosnia-Herzegovina’s contending 
factions were to govern themselves and be governed’, 
including within the realm of security (Innes 2006: 2). The 
goal was to ‘recreate as quickly as possible normal 
conditions of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (DPA 1995: 
Article 1(1), Annex 1A). Against this background, the 
activities of the international security forces can be 
divided into two main categories: (1) activities that aimed 
directly at stabilising the country by preventing any 
further ethnic violence; and (2) those that sought to break 
the critical link between politics and the military and 
police forces. The latter task was deemed, rightly, to be 
the key to weakening the ethnic and nationalist 
manipulation of the security forces. 
 
Military Forces 
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Whereas the decision to maintain wartime ethnic cleavages 
in Bosnia in all likelihood prevented an immediate eruption 
of post-war violence, it also delayed the dismantling and 
professionalization of the various armed formations that 
had been active during the war. This prioritization of what 
could be done ahead of what needed to be done carried the 
risk of these forces being manipulated for ethnic purposes, 
this in a country awash with small arms and light weapons. 
The forces in question ranged from regular military forces 
to reservists, home guards, police officers, civilian 
militias, irregular and paramilitary formations and foreign 
fighters (UN 1994: 31-2). 
 Two annexes in the Dayton Peace Accord stipulated the 
measures the Parties to the conflict had agreed to 
implement with the assistance and supervision of 
international military and police personnel. The NATO-led 
Implementation Force (IFOR)(succeeded by the Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR) from late 1996), was tasked with ensuring a 
definitive cessation of hostilities and the phased 
demobilization and disarmament of all military forces 
(including de-mining actions) along with the disarmament 
and disbanding of all armed civilian groups (except for the 
police) and foreign armies. However, more fundamental 
tasks, such as military restructuring and the creation of a 
national army, were postponed. Accordingly, the conditions 
to which the warring sides agreed through Annex 1A of the 
Dayton accord were largely concerned with consolidating the 
ceasefire rather than deep-rooted reform.  
The ceasefire provisions seemed to have been fulfilled 
’almost to the letter of Dayton’s provisions’ (Cousens & 
Cater 2001: 54). The separation, cantonment and progressive 
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demobilisation of all military forces got underway in 1996, 
followed in 1997 by arms and troop-reduction agreements. 
Despite these achievements, there was a limit to what 
IFOR/SFOR could accomplish in a country now divided along 
ethnic lines and with three ethnically defined wartime 
armies, whose outlook and, in many cases, personnel 
remained unchanged. It also meant that one of the 
mechanisms for the generation of violence (i.e. the 
manipulation of the armed forces) was still in place. In 
some ways this was of IFOR/SFOR’s own making. As described 
by Elisabeth Cousens and Charles Cater in their 2001 
assessment of the situation in Bosnia, IFOR/SFOR’s initial 
reliance on a force separation strategy meant that they 
missed ‘a critical opportunity [...] [B]oth implementation 
forces had the power to sever the link between military 
control of territory and political jurisdiction; but they 
have so far failed to do so’ (2001: 65). This in turn 
adversely affected the capacity of the international 
security presence to control returnee-related violence and 
intimidation.  
The ‘Train and Equip’ programme introduced by the US 
at the time of the Dayton Peace Accord, but outside its 
framework, represents one of the first missed opportunities 
to weaken the nationalist hold on the armed forces. This 
programme was promised in exchange for reaching a peace 
agreement and it essentially re-armed Bosniak-Croat 
Federation forces in order to create an ‘internal balance 
of forces’ in Bosnia (Cousens & Cater 2001: 54; see also 
Pietz 2006: 161-2). The stabilization goal came at the 
price of only nominal integration of the wartime Bosnian 
Croat Army (HVO) and the Bosniak Army (ARBiH), reaffirming 
the existence of three armies in Bosnia. Moreover, it 
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increased the security dependence on NATO as – at the time 
– many considered that this programme gave ‘an awful lot of 
men a lot of guns and taught them how to use them better’ 
(senior SFOR officer quoted in Cousens & Cater 2001: 57).  
What emerged as a particularly important turning-
point, therefore, was the 2003 decision and subsequent 
efforts to merge the wartime military forces through the 
work of a Defence Reform Commission, created by former High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown in order to circumvent 
obstacles blocking this contentious reform.16 It signalled 
a reversal of the policy adopted in the Dayton Accords, 
which accepted, and therefore reinforced, wartime ethnic 
cleavages as a means of avoiding violence. It essentially 
terminated the link between politics and the military 
forces, a link that nationalist parties had used to further 
their territorial agendas during the war. Effective from 
January 2006, this reform process created one common 
Ministry of Defence at the State level, integrating 
Bosniak, Croat and Serb professional forces under one 
operational command structure. Moreover, certain tasks that 
had been common in the early phases of the post-Dayton 
period were now prohibited or removed from military 
doctrine, including the use of military forces by the 
entities for policing the entity boundaries and for 
internal security functions (Staples 2004: 35-6). 
Initiating defence reform – considered one of the most 
successful reforms in post-war Bosnia – had an ‘ice-breaker 
effect’ (Vetschera & Damian 2006: 39) on similar reforms, 
albeit with varying levels of success, in other areas of 
the security sector. 
 
Police Forces 
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In the immediate post-Dayton phase, Bosnia’s police forces 
– corrupt, unreformed and organised along ethnic lines - 
were a major source of violence throughout the country, 
systematically obstructing minority returns and protecting 
war criminals.17 The scale of the problem was noted in a UN 
report of December 1996, according to which 70 per cent of 
human rights violations were committed by police (US 
General Accounting Office 1997: 40). Through intimidation 
and harassment, often at mobile checkpoints set up 
illegally along the inter-Entity boundary, as well as by 
direct physical violence, police forces of all three major 
ethnic groups (though especially Bosnian Croat and Bosnian 
Serb units), continued to pursue their wartime objectives 
of creating ethnically homogeneous entities. As late as 
2002, the International Crisis Group observed that ‘the 
role of the police is not seen as being to “serve and 
protect” everyone, but to serve and protect “one’s own 
kind”, whether they be co-nationals, colleagues or 
political masters’ (ICG 2002a: i). Moreover, they continued 
to play a crucial role in nationalist patronage networks 
(Bechev 2007: 92). As late as 2000, nationalist parties in 
the Federation of BiH continued to exert control over the 
cantonal financial police, whose responsibilities included 
investigating corruption, money laundering and economic 
crimes. This control allowed nationalist parties to 
maintain a system of ‘revenue-raising fines’ from 
businesses and to audit opposition groups during election 
periods (Pugh 2002: 471).  
Halting the police’s involvement in ethnic violence 
required tackling the influence that nationalist and 
criminal networks had over them. Breaking this link has 
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proved a major challenge. The UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the International Police Task Force 
(UNMIBH/IPTF) worked on a number of initiatives aimed at 
terminating the politico-security nexus. An illustrative 
example of UNMIBH/IPTF efforts – continued and extended in 
many respects by the EU Police Mission18 – is the Police 
Commissioner Project, introduced in 2000 with the aim of 
curtailing the wide powers vested in interior ministers by 
creating the position of ‘Police Commissioner’/’Director of 
Police’ and thereby separating policy making (ministers) 
from policy execution (civil servants) (ICG 2002a: 33). The 
latter was supposed to be an experienced police 
professional that would not serve a political agenda in the 
day-to-day management of police work. The implementation of 
this initiative was difficult, with nationalist forces 
either opposing the idea or introducing measures to weaken 
its impact (UN 2001: paragraph 16; ICG 2002a: 33-36). 
However, in many respects the nationalist grip on the 
police remains unchallenged to date, as exemplified by the 
‘failed’ international attempt between 2004-2008 to create 
one single police system and in doing so, reverse the 
fragmentation introduced at Dayton.19  
 
Capabilities, Mandates and Post-War Violence  
 
So far we have analysed efforts by the international 
security presence to contain the political use of 
generalised violence in post-Dayton Bosnia. Equally 
important is the manner in which IFOR/SFOR and UNMIBH/IPTF 
dealt with those situations where violence did occur. In 
this regard, the way in which they defined their mandate 
and went about implementing their responsibilities, 
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particularly vis-à-vis the provision and guarantee of 
public security, was crucial.  
In accordance with Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, the UN established a 2,000-strong IPTF with the 
mandate to assist, advise, monitor, train and inspect 
Bosnian civilian law enforcement personnel. It was the 
responsibility of the local police forces, not the UN 
international civilian mission, to maintain a “safe and 
secure environment for all persons in their respective 
jurisdictions” (DPA 1995). In other words, IPTF had no 
mandate to carry out police actions or to sanction those 
law enforcement agents found to have contravened the Dayton 
Peace Accords; nor were IPTF officers armed. This outcome 
was the direct result of a difference of opinion during the 
negotiations that led to the Dayton Accords between the 
Holbrooke team – which pushed for a strong IPTF mandate and 
armed personnel – and NATO, the Pentagon and some Western 
European governments, who feared that the UN troops, if 
provided with too ambitious a mandate, would get themselves 
into trouble and require NATO troops to intervene and 
protect them (ICG 2002a: 5; Holbrooke 1998: 251-2).20 For 
US decision-makers for whom the images from previous 
interventions – during the Bosnian war but also in Somalia 
and Haiti – were still all too fresh, the preference was 
for a clear, simple mandate that would have American forces 
out of Bosnia within a year. A near obsession with force 
protection on the part of US forces in Bosnia severely 
restricted IFOR and initially SFOR’s ability to limit and 
control post-war violence.  
The limited powers given to IPTF in the peace agreement 
also prevented it from counteracting the violence witnessed 
in the first few years after the Dayton. It also rendered 
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its work and that of UNMIBH more dependent on NATO 
assistance, the very situation the Pentagon and NATO 
decision-makers had tried to avoid. Problematically, IFOR 
and initially SFOR were not keen, on grounds of ‘mission 
creep’, to engage in any activity that resembled law 
enforcement, despite the fact that, under the Dayton 
Accords, NATO forces were meant to participate actively in 
the creation of a secure environment for the implementation 
of the civil aspects of the peace agreement. This backdrop 
helps explain the near total absence of an international 
response to the violence surrounding the transfer to the 
Federation of some Sarajevo suburbs, previously in Bosnian 
Serb hands. Similarly, it helps explain the virtual 
impunity enjoyed by paramilitary forces in the immediate 
post-Dayton phase, as these forces were considered outside 
IFOR/SFOR’s realm of action, based again on a very 
restrictive reading of its powers as granted by the Dayton 
Accords.  
The international military force’s initial 
interpretation of its mandate did not help against the 
increase in inter-ethnic violence during the early post-
Dayton period, something that became strikingly and 
embarrassingly apparent during the Bosnian Serb evacuation 
of Sarajevo. No effort was made to remove illegal 
checkpoints, nor was any serious effort made to apprehend 
war criminals or, more generally, to confront Bosnia’s 
deeply factionalised police forces (Friesendorf 2010: 35-
9). It is a paradox that the aforementioned licence-plate 
reform – initiated and implemented by UN and OHR officials 
on the ground – probably did more in the early post-war 
years to curtail violence than the actions by NATO-led 
forces.  
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The effect of this stance became clear when SFOR – 
following a May 1997 decision by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright – adopted a more proactive 
interpretation of its roles in supporting civilian 
implementation tasks, a decision that contributed directly 
to the decrease in ethnicity-related violent incidents 
(Moodie 1998: 24-5). The change was, however, gradual and 
inconsistent. As a result, inter-ethnic violence frequently 
went unchecked in the years between 1997 and 2000. Still, 
SFOR’s greater activity in protecting returning refugees 
from angry mobs was, for example, an important factor in 
the surge in returns in 2000 (Friesendorf & Penska 2008: 
682). Similarly, its gradual, albeit reluctant, involvement 
in the apprehension of war criminals (although often with 
very restrictive rules of engagement) had a positive impact 
on the refugee return process.21 So too did its efforts, 
tentative and half-hearted at first, to curtail the power 
of the Bosnian special police. The latter were suspected, 
and with good reason, of playing an important role in 
fomenting violence in the post-Dayton period, in protecting 
war criminals and in maintaining secret caches of heavy 
weapons (Moodie 1998: 28; Cousens & Cater 2001: 58).  
Meanwhile, UNMIBH/IPTF’s capacity to intervene in law 
enforcement also increased with time due, at least partly, 
to the restructuring and institution-building powers that 
it acquired from late 1996 onwards. For example, through 
Resolution 1088, UNMIBH/IPTF was given the capacity to 
investigate or assist in investigations of human rights 
abuses committed by law enforcement personnel (UN 1996: 
paragraph 28). This newly acquired prerogative was put to 
use during the certification (or vetting) process that 
sought – among other things – to remove all those police 
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officers with war crime and other criminal records, whether 
those crimes were committed during the war or in the 
immediate aftermath, and those elements that contributed to 
the force’s continued militarization. Thus, although it was 
still not able to use force during episodes of violence or 
directly patrol the streets, these newly acquired powers 
made it into a more credible actor in the control of ethnic 




Levels of overt physical violence in post-war Bosnia were 
comparatively low for two main reasons. In the first 
instance, the undisputed control that each ethnic group had 
over its own territory contributed to a very slow and in 
some ways unsustainable return process, between Entities 
and between Croat and Bosniak areas in the Federation.23 In 
turn, the sustained segregation rendered unnecessary the 
overt use of force as a means of entrenching wartime ethnic 
divisions. ‘The Dayton formula’, in the words of David 
Harland (1997: 13), was to ‘freeze in place the situation 
as it was on the battlefield’. Secondly, the large-scale 
international military and police presence was unable to 
reverse this ethnic bifurcation and, if anything, in the 
immediate post-war period helped to consolidate it as an 
expedient means of maintaining stability (Cox 2008: 255). 
In the words of Cousens and Cater, ‘preventing this 
violence was a task neither wanted by IFOR, which was 
permitted but not obliged to undertake it, nor suitable for 
IPTF’ (2001: 65). This situation delayed the type of 
security sector reform required for long-term post-war 
stability.  
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The international security presence has therefore 
helped to maintain a ceasefire in the country. Given the 
ferocity, the polarisation and the open wounds left by the 
war of 1992-5, this achievement should not be undervalued. 
However, the decisions taken in terms of mandate design and 
interpretation – particularly in the early post-war period 
– have, arguably, failed to tackle structural bases of 
violence. Political turmoil in the last few years has been 
interpreted by some analysts as Bosnia being ‘on the brink 
of collapse’ with Bosnians ‘once again talking about the 
potential for war’ (McMahon & Western 2009: 69). Srecko 
Latal has argued that inter-ethnic incidents are on the 
rise, from a monthly average of seven in 2007, to nine in 
2008 and almost thirteen in 2009. He interprets this trend 
as meaning that ‘local politicians could be losing their 
control over the masses’ (Latal 2010). This view is not 
universally shared by those in the field, with questions 
being raised about the capacity today of local actors to 
generate large-scale organized violence faced with the 
international presence, the security and institutional 
measures brought in since Dayton, and the changed regional 
context. However, even those who question the likelihood of 
war or large-scale violence acknowledge the deteriorating 
climate of political dialogue and the dysfunctionality and 
lack of legitimacy of political institutions, leading – in 
the words of a long-standing international observer – to a 
‘complete lack of hope of any change for the better’.24 It 
points to the dilemma of conducting operations that 
prioritize what can be done ahead of what needs to be done, 
in other words, short-term goals of violence reduction over 
longer-term aims of peacebuilding. In the words of a police 
expert, the political turmoil in the last few years shows 
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an ‘unresolved sense of trust massed over by the huge 
international presence that substituted for it’.25 It also 
raises the question of whether Bosnia is today ready to 
stand on its own feet, or whether its stability remains a 
function of the ongoing international military, police and 
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 Bosnia or BiH is used throughout the chapter to refer to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
2
 According to the 1991 census, ‘Muslim by nationality’ accounted for 
43.7 per cent of the population, Bosnian Serbs 31.4 per cent and 
Bosnian Croats 17.3 per cent with the remainder including various 
other ethnic groups and self-declared ‘Yugoslavs’ (Bieber 2006: 2).  
3
 See ‘Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-1995’ (also known as 
the “Bosnian Book of the Dead”), Research and Documentation Centre 
Sarajevo, www.idc.org.ba.  
4
 The NATO presence was reduced to 32,000 in December 1996. The UN 
presence came closest to its authorised strength in November 1997.  
5
 See for example Holbrooke 1998: xv.  
6
 Information available on the Centre’s website: 
http://www.idc.org.ba/prezentacija/rezultati_istrazivanja.htm. For a 
detailed account of the politics and process of knowledge production 
in relation to this example see Nettlefield 2010.  
7
 The authors are grateful to Lara Nettlefield for her comments in 
relation to this point. 
8
 For Mostar as a persistent site of violence and intimidation related 
to refugee return, see Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2004. 
9
 These abuses have been well documented by Human Rights Watch in its 
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(accessed on 31 August 2010).  
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 Interview with Martin Barber, Deputy Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) from 1996 to 1998, London, January 2010. 
11
 See Ashdown and Holbrooke (2008). 
12
 The UNHCR statistics point out that since 2007 returnee numbers 
(including minority returns) are based on incomplete data submitted by 
local authorities. In December 2007 return data looked as follows: 
578,400 internally displaced people and 446,600 refugees (UNHCR 2007).  
13
 The percentages are approximate figures based on the authors’ 
calculation using the UNHCR 2010 data. The number of minority returns 
in 2007 stood at 465,700 (UNHCR 2007).  
14
 Confidential interviews with Bosnian citizens who lived in the 
country at the time in question, Sarajevo, August-September 2008. 
15
 This data is based on the authors’ comparison of municipal council 
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official site of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (www.izbori.ba, accessed on 10 May 2009). 
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arguments to the exigencies of joining NATOs’ PfP programme. A number 
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17
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18
 On 1 January 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over 
from the UN the responsibility for policing matters in Bosnia. 
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 While progress has been made in terms of building citizen trust (ICG 
2009: 2-3), the ongoing fragmentation of the current system, which 
included 15 operationally independent law enforcement agencies before 
2008, works against the development of a robust police that is able to 
withstand political pressures.  
20
 Some also feared that arming the IPTF would slow down the police 
reform process by encouraging dependence on international security 
structures. Interview with Martin Barber, former UNMIBH senior 
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 Interview with Martin Barber, former UNMIBH senior official, London, 
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